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Abstract
We test the theoretical prediction that inter-firm spillovers must necessarily be large for the
profit differential between cooperation and non-cooperation in R and D to be monotone
increasing with them. By using the French data from the 2002 Community Innovation
Survey, we find that spillovers have a significant positive impact on the likelihood that
competitors cooperate horizontally in R and D only if these spillovers exceed a threshold.
Both the value and the significance of estimates increase with the flow of information firms
report receiving from competitors.
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The relationship between technological spillovers and the proﬁtability of R&D cooperation has
received much attention in the theoretical industrial organization literature. Most models consider
oligopolistic ﬁrms which may cooperate in R&D with rivals (i.e., horizontal cooperation), and which
focus on cost-reducing R&D (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, Kamien, Muller and Zang 1992,
De Bondt 1997, among others). Although these models may have diﬀerent setups, they all ﬁnd
that ﬁrms earn higher proﬁts when they cooperate in R&D than when they do not. Moreover,
the proﬁtability of R&D cooperation increases with the level of R&D spillovers only when they are
suﬃciently high. Another stream of the literature focuses on quality-improving R&D in models with
vertical product diﬀerentiation (Motta 1992, Rosenkranz 1995). Although these papers diﬀer from
the cost-reducing R&D models in some of their speciﬁcations, they also ﬁnd that R&D cooperation
increases ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
A few papers propose a dynamic model of ﬁrms’ choice to cooperate in R&D (Kesteloot and
Veugelers, 1995). When incoming spillovers are distinguished from outgoing ones, it is found that
only the latter may result in higher incentives to free ride on R&D partners while incoming spillovers
increase the attractiveness of cooperation. This leads to the theoretical prediction that horizontal
R&D cooperation is more likely to be observed the higher the spillovers coming from rivals.
Surprisingly, these well-established theoretical results have received very little empirical sup-
port. Only a few papers investigate the empirical link between R&D spillovers and R&D coop-
eration. Those which do so reach mixed results. As most existing analyses use relatively small
data sets, they cannot distinguish between cooperative agreements exclusively among competitors
in the same industry from other possible types of partners (suppliers, customers, universities, in-
dependent labs). Kaiser (2002) considers three categories of R&D agreements: horizontal, vertical
(with customers and /or suppliers), and mixed, i.e. those which are horizontal and vertical. He
ﬁnds that horizontal spillovers have a weakly signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on ﬁrms’ propensity to
cooperate while they do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the choice of vertical or mixed cooperation. How-
ever, as Kaiser’s (2002) analysis concerns only the German service sector it may be diﬃcult to
extrapolate the results to the whole population of ﬁrms. Moreover, as only few ﬁrms (that is, 36
ﬁrms) cooperate horizontally, they are included in the mixed agreements category (Kaiser 2002,
p. 760). Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) use Flemish data to ﬁnd that ﬁrms which beneﬁtt h e
most from public information sources are more likely to cooperate in R&D. However, they cannot
investigate horizontal cooperation separately because only 33 ﬁrms in their survey cooperated in
R&D with competitors (Cassiman and Veugelers 2002, footnote 10, page 1172).
1Sharper results appear in a paper by Belderbos, Caree, Diederen, Lokshin and Veugelers (2004),
who construct a multivariate probit model to explore diﬀerences in the determinants of innovat-
ing ﬁrms’ decisions to participate in three distinct types of cooperation (with competitors, with
suppliers or customers, with universities and research institutes).1 With a large Dutch dataset
(627 ﬁrms with R&D cooperation of some type), it is found that incoming spillovers, which specif-
ically originate from competitors, are statistically signiﬁcant (at the 10% level) in explaining R&D
cooperation with ﬁrms from the same industry.
We contribute to this emerging empirical literature by using French data from the 2002 Com-
munity Innovation Survey (CIS), which is conducted in member countries of the European Union,
to investigate the link between horizontal R&D cooperation and R&D spillovers received from com-
petitors. More speciﬁcally, in this note we focus on the connection between the discrete levels of
incoming spillovers, as reported by respondents, and the proﬁtd i ﬀerential between inter-ﬁrm hori-
zontal cooperation and non-cooperation in R&D. Our objective is to test the theoretical prediction
that spillovers must necessarily be large for the proﬁtd i ﬀerential to be monotone increasing with
them. To our knowledge, this point has not been tested in the literature.
Our main results exploit the link between a non-binary detailed measure of information ﬁrms
receive from competitors and their incentive to engage in horizontal R&D agreements to obtain
new insights. First, we ﬁnd that incoming spillovers have a signiﬁcant positive impact on the
likelihood that a ﬁrm cooperates horizontally in R&D only if these spillovers exceed a threshold
level. Second, the estimates of the impact of spillovers on the decision to cooperate, together with
their precision, are increasing in the value of the measure of information ﬂow. In addition, this
empirical analysis can also be read as a test of the robustness of existing empirical results to the
use of a larger and more recent dataset. It conﬁrms Belderbos et al. (2004) in that ﬁrms are more
likely to cooperate horizontally the more they beneﬁt from competitors in the industry as their
main source of information.
The remainder of the note is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical model and
data. We then discuss the results in section 3 and conclude in section 4. Tables 1 to 3 are in the
appendix.
1We refer the reader to Belderbos et al. (2004) for a thorough survey of the theoretical and empirical literatures
on horizontal R&D cooperation.
22 Model and data
Denote by m the R&D organizational mode, with m =0if a ﬁrm does not cooperate horizontally
in R&D, and m =1if she does. Let πm(s,x) denote a ﬁrm’s proﬁts as a function of technological
spillovers s and a vector of characteristics x. The beneﬁts from cooperation are given by:
∆(s,x)=π1(s,x) − π0(s,x)+ε,
= sγ + xβ + ε, (1)
where ε is a mean-zero normally distributed error term which captures the impact of unobservables
on the beneﬁts of cooperation, γ is a parameter and β is a vector of parameters. The second line
of (1) is a linear approximation of the diﬀerence in proﬁts when a ﬁrm cooperates versus does not
cooperate. The diﬀerence ∆(s,x) is not observable but a ﬁrm chooses:
m =
(
1 if ε ≥− (sγ + xβ)
0 if ε < −(sγ + xβ)
(2)
Equation (2) is a simple probit model. The null hypothesis of interest is γ =0which can be tested
by using the 2002 CIS data for France.
The survey includes a representative sample of 7,016 establishments in France. Firms reported
whether they had any cooperation arrangements on innovation activities between 1998 and 2000.
There are 3,830 ﬁrms for which we know whether they cooperated or not.2 This constitutes a
larger dataset than the ones used in existing studies on the same topic. We distinguish between
cooperative arrangements with any type of partner (1,511 ﬁrms) and cooperative arrangements only
with competitors and other ﬁrms from the same industry (376 ﬁrms). This distinction allows us to
focus on horizontal cooperation, which is the subject of the theoretical literature of interest. While
rivals choose to cooperate in order to maximize their individual proﬁt s ,t h i si sn o tn e c e s s a r i l yt h e
case for establishments within the same group, where proﬁts are consolidated, or for ﬁrm-university
agreements.
The relevant summary statistics, diﬀerentiated by whether ﬁrms do not cooperate, cooperate
with any type of partner, or cooperate horizontally, are given in Table 1. Firms which cooperate
are on average much bigger, and export more, than those which do not. The share of ﬁrms
which innovated by cooperating with other ﬁrms in the past is highest for those which report
2The survey lists 9 possible partners: Other enterprises within your enterprise group; Suppliers of equipment,
materials, components or software; Clients or customers; Competitors and other ﬁrms from the same industry;
Consultants; Commercial laboratories/R&D enterprises; Universities; and Government or private non-proﬁt research
institutes (see section 8.2 of the third CIS harmonized questionnaire).
3cooperating horizontally between 1998 and 2000. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the percentage
of multinationals which do not cooperate or those which choose to cooperate with any type of
partner or horizontally. Firms which cooperate horizontally have the highest R&D intensity.
As suggested by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002, p. 1169) and Belderbos et al. (2004, pp. 1245-
6), we distinguish between horizontal ﬁrm-level and industry-level incoming spillovers. As in the
latter papers, we can proxy R&D spillovers among competitors by using a speciﬁc feature of the CIS
questionnaire. Firms were asked to rank from 0 (unimportant) to 3 (highest) if “information from
competitors and other enterprises from the same industry” is a source for innovation.3 We use that
variable as a direct measure of ﬁrm-level incoming spillovers, and average the scores at the NACE
2-digit sector level for industry-level incoming spillovers. Given our focus on horizontal cooperation,
these measures allow us to better capture technological spillovers as commonly understood in the
theoretical literature.
We need to control for other factors which potentially incite ﬁrms to cooperate, so as to isolate
the eﬀect of horizontal incoming spillovers. We draw from the literature mentioned above to
identify the explanatory variables, and list them in the ﬁrst column of Table 2. In particular, we
do control for ﬁrm participation in cooperative agreements with other types of partners. However,
we acknowledge that we cannot fully account for ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved characteristics. Doing so
would require panel data as in Belderbos et. al. (2004). Unfortunately, given that the questionnaires
used in the successive waves of the Community Innovation Survey for France diﬀer signiﬁcantly,
such an option is not possible. The question on sources of information used in various types of
R&D cooperation lists 12 possibilities in the 1997 CIS and only 9 possibilities in the 2002 CIS.
Harmonizing future surveys should help address this issue and conﬁr mt h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ho u r
results are robust. The next section discusses our estimates.
3R e s u l t s
The results in Table 2 are for two types of dependent variables: models 1-A and 1-B concern
cooperation with all types of partners; models 2-A and 2-B are for cooperation among rival ﬁrms
only. For each type of dependent variable we consider two speciﬁcations for the source of information
for innovation “from competitors and other ﬁrms from the same industry”: (A) the respondent’s
3It seems that “information from competitors and other enterprises from the same industry” as a source of
innovation does not appear in the Belgian 1993 survey used by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002, see p. 1171), who
refer to three sources of information: (i) patents; (ii) specialist conferences, meetings and publications; (iii) trade
shows and seminars.
4score, and (B) a dummy variable for each of the three values of that variable. This distinction
allows us to capture potential non-linearity, and threshold eﬀect, in how that variable aﬀects the
incentives for ﬁrms to cooperate horizontally in R&D.
We ﬁnd that none of the sources of information which ﬁrms used to innovate between 1998
and 2000 reduces their likelihood of cooperating in R&D. Only the sources from competitors, from
other establishments within the same group, and from universities, are statistically signiﬁcant in
explaining R&D cooperation at large, i.e. when partners are not discriminated. Sources from other
establishments within the same group matter for cooperation only when we do not distinguish
among types of partners. In other words, this type of information is only relevant for cooperation
among establishments within the same group and is not useful for horizontal cooperation. When
cooperation is with any type of partner, ﬁrm-level incoming spillovers have no statistically positive
eﬀect on the likelihood that ﬁrms cooperate (model 1-A). However, when we restrict R&D coopera-
tion to competitors only, these spillovers do have a statistically positive eﬀect on the likelihood that
ﬁrms cooperate in R&D (model 2-A). These results are robust to allowing for potential endoge-
nous spillovers at the ﬁrm-level, but the size of the coeﬃcient increases signiﬁcantly (see Table 3).
This is as in Cassiman and Veugelers (2002, p. 1175), who also ﬁnd that accounting for potential
endogeneity increases the size of their estimates.
Our main results are obtained at a ﬁner level of analysis. We ﬁnd that ﬁrm-level incom-
ing spillovers are still not statistically signiﬁcant in model 1-B. Interestingly, in model 2-B these
spillovers are not signiﬁcant when they are low. However, they have a signiﬁcant and increasingly
positive impact on the likelihood that a ﬁrm cooperates in R&D when they exceed a threshold.
When the reported level of incoming spillovers is low, their impact on the likelihood to cooperate
with rivals is only slightly positive (+0.098) and not signiﬁcant. When the level is intermediate, the
impact is higher (+0.318) and signiﬁcant (at the 5% level). When respondents report the highest
level of incoming spillovers, the impact is even higher (+0.466) and more signiﬁcant (at the 1%
level). These estimates, together with the associated statistical signiﬁcativity, are consistent with
the theoretical prediction that the proﬁtability of R&D cooperation increases with the level of R&D
spillovers when they are suﬃciently high.
Concerning the other explanatory variables of cooperation in R&D, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms which
beneﬁted from central government or European Union public funding are more likely to cooperate
than those which received no funding. It is not surprising that larger ﬁrms, and those where a larger
share of their personnel do R&D (R&D intensity), are more likely to cooperate. These ﬁndings
suggest that a threshold level of ﬁnancial and human resources is necessary for ﬁrms to cooperate in
R&D. Moreover, ﬁrms which successfully innovated by cooperating with other ﬁrms or institutions
5are more likely to cooperate in R&D. This means that conditional on a successful experience,
cooperation in R&D is persistent. Finally, the multinational dummy is never statistically signiﬁcant
in all speciﬁcations.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The theoretical industrial organization literature predicts that, in a given industry, the proﬁtability
of cooperating horizontally in R&D — vis-à-vis non-cooperation — increases monotonically with the
l e v e lo fi n t e r - ﬁrm spillovers only if the information ﬂow is large. We use the large dataset produced
by the 2002 Community Innovation Survey for France to test this claim. A speciﬁc feature of our
note is that it exploits a three-level measurement of the magnitude of incoming spillovers as directly
reported by ﬁrm respondents. We obtain that incoming spillovers have a positive and signiﬁcant
impact on the likelihood that a ﬁrm cooperates horizontally in R&D only when they exceed a
threshold. Moreover, we ﬁnd that both the probability of inter-ﬁrm cooperation and the degree
of signiﬁcativity of estimations increase with the level of a discrete scaling of received information
ﬂows from competitors. This oﬀers support to a well-known theoretical prediction that has received
no speciﬁc empirical attention.
A lot certainly remains to be done for the exploration of real-world ﬁrms’ decision to participate
in R&D cooperative agreements. While most analyses assume that R&D spillovers are exogenous,
more recent theoretical research allows ﬁrms to choose spillovers as a strategic variable (e.g., Kamien
and Zang (2000), Grünfeld (2003), Wiethaus (2005)). In an important paper on this issue, Amir et
al. (2003, pp. 190-8) emphasize that ﬁrms may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to control inter-ﬁrm information
ﬂows on top of an incompressible or “natural” industry-speciﬁc level of spillovers. This minimum
level is rooted in structural conditions, that is in technological, organizational, and human factors
of all kinds. Although we have checked, in the simplest manner, that our results are robust to
allowing for potential endogenous spillovers at the ﬁrm-level, they do not inform on the respective
contribution of natural and endogenous levels of spillovers to the proﬁtability of R&D cooperation.
This should be addressed in further research.
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7Table 1: Summary statistics
2002 Community Innovation Survey (CIS) --  France
No cooperation All cooperation Agreements between 
agreements agreements competitors only
Cooperation
Percentage of firms 61 39 10
Importance of sources of information for innovation from 
(1)
Competitors and other enterprises from the same industry 1,4 1,7 2,0
Other establishments within the group 0,9 1,4 1,4
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software 1,4 1,6 1,7
Within the establishment 2,2 2,5 2,6
Universities  0,4 0,9 1,1
Government or private non-profit research institute 0,4 0,8 1,0
Professional conferences, meetings and journals 0,9 1,1 1,3
Fairs and exhibitions 1,1 1,2 1,3
Clients or customers 1,9 2,1 2,3
Percentage which successfully innovated by cooperating with other firms in the past 19 33 39
Size and R&D personnel
Average turnover in 1998 (in euros) 71 261 363 036 796 225
Average exports in 1998 (in euros) 16 947 152 795 349 510
Average number of employees in 1998 293 1 051 2 156
R&D intensity in percentage 
(2) 4,4 6,5 8,2
Organizational feature
Percentage of multinationals
 (3) 46 48 47
Percentage of establishments which are part of a group 74 87 85
Percentage which obtained public  funding for innovation from
Local or regional authorities 61 3 1 7
The central government 14 33 39
The European Union 31 6 2 6
Industry-level effects
Industry-level spillovers
 (4) 1,5 1,6 1,6
Industry-level average log of employee 5,0 5,3 5,3
Notes
(1) A score of 0 to 3 is attributed by firms to each one of the 9 sources of information for innovation.
(2) R&D intensity is the ratio of number of employees doing R&D to the total number of employees.
(4) Industry-level spillovers is the average at 2-digit NACE of information obtained from competitors and other enterprises.
(3) Percentage of firms with headquarters outside France. The first column means that 46% of all firms which do not cooperate are multinationals.
 
8Table 2: Probit Estimates of the Determinants of R&D Cooperation
2002 Community Innovation Survey (CIS) -- France
Dependent variable equals 1 if a firm cooperates in R&D
Model (1-A) (1-B) (2-A) (2-B)
Importance of sources of information for innovation from
Competitors and other enterprises from the same industry 0,027 0.168***
(0,784) (3,617)
Dummy equals 1 if firm sources from competitors equals 1
(1) 0,079 0,098
(0,777) (0,651)
Dummy equals 1 if firm sources from competitors equals 2
(1) 0,078 0.318**
(0,781) (2,202)
Dummy equals 1 if firm sources from competitors equals 3
(1) 0,103 0.466***
(0,904) (2,994)
Other establishments within the group 0.152*** 0.151*** -0,002 0,000
(5,100) (5,043) (0,046) (0,012)
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software 0,016 0,015 0,022 0,023
(0,511) (0,469) (0,534) (0,562)
Within the establishment 0,028 0,027 0,061 0,062
(0,747) (0,704) (1,139) (1,167)
Universities 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.203*** 0.203***
(5,254) (5,262) (3,295) (3,300)
Government or private non-profit research institute 0.111** 0.110** 0,058 0,059
(2,109) (2,092) (0,942) (0,961)
Professional conferences, meetings and journals 0,005 0,005 0,002 0,001
(0,100) (0,103) (0,030) (0,023)
Fairs and exhibitions -0,033 -0,033 -0,037 -0,037
(0,758) (0,753) (0,630) (0,637)
Clients or customers -0,029 -0,03 0,04 0,04
(0,897) (0,930) (0,907) (0,921)
Size and R&D personnel
Log of 1998 turnover 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.166*** 0.166***
(3,735) (3,724) (4,194) (4,205)
Log of 1998 exports 0,021 0,021 -0,038 -0,038
(1,007) (1,016) (1,424) (1,444)
R&D intensity 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(3,656) (3,662) (3,574) (3,580)
R&D intensity squared (divided by 100) -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.044*** -0.044***
(3,245) (3,246) (2,901) (2,914)
Organizational feature
Multinational dummy -0,092 -0,094 -0,126 -0,125
(1,358) (1,372) (1,490) (1,477)
Establishment is part of a group 0,141 0,142 -0,008 -0,01
(1,196) (1,201) (0,055) (0,068)
Firm successfully innovated by cooperating with other firms 0.393*** 0.393*** 0.205** 0.204**
(5,672) (5,668) (2,543) (2,535)
Obtained public funding for innovation from
Local or regional authorities -0,016 -0,016 0,066 0,063
(0,132) (0,129) (0,511) (0,492)
The central government 0.406*** 0.407*** 0.247*** 0.247***
(5,115) (5,141) (2,685) (2,687)
The European Union 0.463*** 0.463*** 0.297*** 0.297***
(4,047) (4,053) (2,618) (2,619)
Industry-level effects
Industry-level spillovers
 (2) 0,387 0,386 0,394 0,395
(1,624) (1,624) (1,287) (1,290)
Industry-level average log of employees 0,060 0,062 0,144 0,143
(0,658) (0,673) (1,187) (1,180)
Industry dummies 
(3)
NACE 1 -0,218 -0,219 -0,278 -0,276
(1,247) (1,254) (1,339) (1,330)
NACE 2 -0,074 -0,075 -0.573*** -0.571***
(0,404) (0,408) (2,618) (2,601)
NACE 3 -0,327 -0,328 -0.713*** -0.710***
(1,478) (1,487) (2,634) (2,620)
NACE 4 0,638 0,627 -0,79 -0,784
(0,898) (0,876) (1,405) (1,394)
NACE 5 -0,277 -0,271 -0,01 -0,015
(1,348) (1,317) (0,039) (0,057)
NACE 6 -0.685** -0.683** -0.757** -0.755**
(2,531) (2,526) (2,233) (2,222)
Constant -3.188*** -3.210*** -4.539*** -4.508***
(6,827) (6,844) (7,574) (7,522)
Number of observations 2 133 2 133 2 133 2 133
Log-likelihood -1 195 -1 195 -707 -707
Pseudo R-square 0,19 0,19 0,15 0,15
Wald Chi-square 442 442 225 226
Notes Absolute vales of robust t-ratios are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(1) The reference group is composed of firms for which the source of information from competitiors is not relevant.
(2) See footnote 4 of Table 1.
(3) The industry is defined at the NACE 1-digit sector level. The reference industry is  NACE 7.
Cooperation with
All types of partners Rivals only
 
 9Table 3: Accounting for endogenous firm-level spillovers
2002 Community Innovation Survey (CIS) -- France
OLS First stage Probit Second stage
Dependent variable Firm-level spillovers
(1) Model (2-A BIS)
(1)
Importance of sources of information for innovation from
Fitted values of  Competitors and other enterprises from the same industry 1.920***
(3,925)
Other establishments within the group 0,011
(0,296)
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software 0,029
(0,696)




Government or private non-profit research institute 0,068
(1,083)
Professional conferences, meetings and journals 0,054
(0,849)
Fairs and exhibitions -0,04
(0,672)




1998 turnover square (divided by 1,000,000) -2.01*
(1,723)
Share of new or improved products to market 0.257*
(1,901)
Size and R&D personnel
Log of 1998 turnover 0.098**
(2,337)









Establishment is part of a group 0.282*** -0.449**
(6,103) (2,323)
Firm successfully innovated by cooperating with other firms 0.207**
(2,488)
Obtained public funding for innovation from
Local or regional authorities 0,055
(0,424)
The central government 0.229**
(2,416)










NACE 1 0.297*** -0.845***
(4,129) (3,429)
NACE 2 0.368*** -1.282***
(5,754) (4,474)
NACE 3 0.541*** -1.795***
(7,694) (4,635)
NACE 4 0.409* -1.798***
(1,729) (2,661)
NACE 5 -0,017 -0,045
(0,167) (0,161)




Number of observations 3 315 2 026
Notes
(2) The dependent variable equals 1 if a firm cooperates with her rivals, and 0 otherwise.
Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) The dependent variable is the score 0,1,2 or 3 which a firm assigns to the importance of sources of information for innovation 
from competitors and the model is estimated by OLS as in Cassiman and Veugelers (2002).
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